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Make Afrikaners great again! National populism, democracy and the new white minority politics in post-apartheid South Africa

Danelle van Zyl-Hermann

International Studies Group, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa

ABSTRACT

This article on national populism in South Africa brings a view from the South to scholarship overwhelmingly concentrated on the north Atlantic and European world. While in white majority contexts, national populism seeks to capture formal political power, the white minority’s lack of political leverage in post-apartheid South Africa sees an assertion of white autonomy emerge in the civil society arena. The article examines the discursive strategies of the Solidarity Movement, a broad-based social movement which claims to represent the white minority, particularly white Afrikaans-speakers, amid black majority rule. It shows how through a reinvention of the past, recasting of race, and reformulation of nationalist narratives by neoliberal logics the Movement discursively undermines black majority rule, and seeks to create spaces in which white privilege, power and identities are maintained. These findings provide new insights into the relation between populism and democracy, and hold important lessons for the increasingly multicultural global North.

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Introduction

Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign slogan “Make America Great Again!” captured the essence of the current wave of national populism sweeping the globe. Parties and politicians touting protectionist policies built on anti-globalization and often xenophobic sentiments have rapidly been amassing support among electorates disillusioned by the economic insecurity, lack of local autonomy and challenges of multiculturalism characterizing interconnected economies and societies. In this context, the political logic of populism, which “pits a virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity
and voice” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 3; see also Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005), combines with nationalist constructions of “the people” as a homogenous cultural community corresponding to a particular territory or state (Anderson 1983; Brubaker 2004). This polarization of “us” against “them”, explains Brubaker (2017; following Taguieff 1995), functions both vertically and horizontally, as national culture and security is perceived as threatened by both a self-serving elite and unscrupulous outsiders. From these oppositional social relations, populists emerge as the “secularized saviours” of “the people” (Brubaker 2017, 1207).

Critical scholarship on the current populist conjuncture has overwhelmingly concentrated on the north Atlantic and northern European world and the dramatic developments surrounding Brexit, Trumpism and the populist right-wing parties increasingly making their presence in countries like France, The Netherlands, Germany and Austria (Ford and Goodwin 2014; Panitch and Albo 2015; Brubaker 2017; Hunter 2017). Here, scholars have located the origins of anti-multiculturalism in the aftermath of 9/11, with white cultural nationalism and popular hostility towards immigrants accelerating in response to the 2008 global financial crash and migrant crisis facing Europe since 2015. White working-class communities – those most likely to compete with foreign job seekers or at risk of neoliberal rationalization – are often identified as key support bases for the new right (Ford and Goodwin 2014; Edgar 2016). In these contexts, populists vie for votes by promising to once again put national interests first.

This article examines comparable sentiments emerging in a very different context: among the white minority in post-apartheid South Africa. Here, the Solidarity Movement is driving a national populist reinvigoration of ethnic and racial identity politics. Contrary to whiteness scholars’ portrayal of white racial and ethnic identity as fractured, “in distress” and on the defensive, this represents a new assertiveness in the white minority. The Movement’s anti-establishment attitudes, calls for autonomy, and cultural nationalism are cast as a response to the corruption and state failure which has increasingly characterized South Africa since president Jacob Zuma of the African National Congress (ANC) took office in 2009. Closer examination shows, however, that more than just an anti-Zuma movement, its antagonism is directed at all black South Africans, represented as the unscrupulous majority “other” threatening white livelihoods and cultural identity. In 2015, the Movement launched a five-year plan, through which it promised to “rebuild a future in which we can have lasting freedom, security and prosperity” (Maroela Media, May 5, 2015). Faced with a government “concentrating on blacks”, the Movement undertook to put whites first (Netwerk24, October 4, 2015).

This article examines the discursive strategies which galvanize the Solidarity Movement’s politics and campaigns. It draws on documentary and media sources reflecting the Movement’s public communications, key informant
interviews with Movement executives, and a three-month period of fieldwork at its headquarters, during which I was able to attend meetings, interact freely with employees and members, and gain an understanding of the Movement’s narratives from within. This unique material facilitates this analysis of the Solidarity Movement’s discursive strategies, showing how these reinvent the past; recast race; and reformulate nationalist narratives by neoliberal logics. Throughout, this involves foregrounding ethnic and racial identities while downplaying other social divisions. In this way, the Movement legitimizes its claim to be the voice of the post-apartheid white minority, and Afrikaners in particular, and mobilizes support for strategies which bolster white power, privilege and ideologies of superiority.

Panizza’s (2005) notion of populism as the “mirror of democracy” captures the problematic relation between these two ideas: do populist efforts to reassert popular sovereignty and express the will of “the people” reflect the true essence of democracy, or does its polarizing political logic and disregard for political institutions threaten to undo the democratic project? This question is as pertinent in South Africa’s young democracy as it is in the north Atlantic and European world. Typically, answers are sought by considering populist mobilizations emerging from disaffected majority communities – often, as with recent Western European populisms, in response to the perceived threat posed by unassimilated cultural minorities and immigrants. This article, by contrast, considers populist mobilization among a territorially dispersed and historically powerful minority in opposition to the perceived threat posed by the majority. This brings a view from the South to scholarship on the dynamics of contemporary national populism, offering an opportunity to consider populist mobilization and its consequences for democracy from a different angle. While in white majority contexts national populists have sought to capture formal political power, South Africa’s white minority shows that this challenge can also emerge in the civil society arena. This article shows how national populist rhetoric and campaigns in this arena serve to undermine the legitimacy of majority rule and create spaces in which minority privilege, power and identities can be maintained and strengthened. These findings hold important lessons for the global North, where population trends are steadily shifting towards racial and cultural heterogeneity.

**Whiteness in post-apartheid South Africa**

For whites, the end of minority rule in 1994 is said to have been “nothing less than traumatic” (Visser 2007, 1). Post-apartheid South Africa confronted them with an assertive Africanism in national politics and the public service, racial redress policies favouring the previously disadvantaged population, and strains produced by high levels of unemployment and crime in a deeply
unequal society. Once the beneficiaries and power-wielders of the apartheid state, Afrikaners in particular found their “worldview ... imploded” (Steyn 2004, 143). An overhaul of national symbols and narratives by discourses of multiculturalism and nation-building, as well as the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, saw once unquestioned understandings of Afrikaner history, identity and morality contested and replaced (Vestergaard 2001; Giliomee 2004; Louw 2004; Giliomee 2011).

Whiteness scholars have shown how, in the aftermath of the racial state’s demise, white communities struggle to come to terms with their “new” minority status (Alsheh and Elliker 2015), try to maintain white privilege in the face of black power (Steyn and Foster 2008), or work to “rehabilitate an ethnic whiteness in distress” (Blaser and Van der Westhuizen 2012, 385). White identity, the scholarly consensus holds, has become fractured and incoherent. Many white Afrikaans-speakers retreated from a context perceived as hostile into “comfort zones” (Ballard 2004) in the cultural and private spheres. Some adopted a defensive and exclusivist ethnicity through discourses of post-apartheid victimhood and marginalization, a strategy typically read as masking efforts to maintain power, privilege and racist subjectivities associated with whiteness (Steyn 2001; Van der Waal and Robins 2011; Van der Waal 2012; Verwey and Quayle 2012). This included appeals to minority rights – although this strategy has also been employed to mobilize around a more inclusive Afrikaans identity focused on language (Davies 2009; Boersema 2012; Kriel 2012). Moreover, evidence suggests that the depoliticizing dynamics of contemporary late capitalism, and its emphasis on individual freedom and choice, is diluting collective ethnic identification. An embrace of neoliberalism is either seeing white Afrikaans-speakers reconstructed as individual ethnic consumers of the burgeoning Afrikaans arts and culture industry, or leading to the erosion of ethnic identity among those Afrikaners – predominantly capital elites – for whom access to the global economy offers new opportunities for identity formulation (Davies 2009; Blaser 2012; Blaser and Van der Westhuizen 2012). Empirical studies therefore demonstrate the extent to which Afrikaners’ post-apartheid ethnic identification has come to “[vary] widely in terms of salience, intensity and meaning” (Davies 2009, 7; also Steyn 2001; Steyn 2004; Visser 2007; Steyn and Foster 2008). With Afrikaner nationalism denounced as a “spent force” (Blaser 2012, 1), the prospects for ethnic mobilization are judged to be “fragile at best” (Davies 2009, 3).

The Solidarity Movement’s national populism challenges scholarly views of defensive whiteness and fragile Afrikaner ethnic identification. The Movement’s ambitious and assertive new white politics has emerged in the context of the contemporary crisis of the South African state. Since 1994, the ANC embraced neoliberal macroeconomic policies which, alongside patronimonal politics and crony capitalism developing in the party’s ranks, severely impaired the government’s ability to deliver on promises of economic and
social justice (Bond 2000; Marais 2011; Beresford 2015). Amid the persistence of appalling levels of inequality and unemployment, and deteriorating public services and infrastructure, Zuma’s incumbency in particular has been marked by allegations of mismanaged public funds, political patronage, corruption and efforts to undermine the independence of public institutions. As critics denounced a “degenerative” political elite (Bond 2014), running a “predatory” state (Southall 2016), growing public frustration led to community uprisings, industrial action and organized protests, so that South Africa is currently witnessing levels of public action unprecedented since the end of apartheid (Beresford 2016).

The Solidarity Movement

On 10 October 2015, some 3,000 white Afrikaans-speakers assembled in Centurion, outside Pretoria, to attend the Toekomsberaad (“Future Summit”) – a public meeting organized by the Solidarity Movement. This broad-based social movement, comprising several interconnected organizations, claims to represent Afrikaner minority interests in post-apartheid South Africa. The year 2015 had seen the Movement become increasingly vocal in its criticism of the ANC government, with its CEO Flip Buys claiming that dysfunctional public services, rampant crime and corruption, and xenophobic violence signalled “imminent state collapse”. He warned, moreover, of the “growing danger that the government, despite paying lip service to the Constitution, is moving from majority rule to majority domination” (Maroela Media, April 27, 2015) and “governing against Afrikaners” (Maroela Media, May 4, 2015).

At the Toekomsberaad, the Movement unveiled its solution to this apocalyptic assessment of South Africa and Afrikaners’ position in it. Against a backdrop of banners sporting the Movement’s insignia, Buys announced the launch of Helpmekaar 2020 (“Mutual Aid 2020”), a plan for securing a “free, secure and prosperous future” for Afrikaners in South Africa. The plan – worth 3.5 billion rand, some 270 million US dollars – would see the Movement, through its constituent organizations, provide Afrikaners with the support, protection and services they were ostensibly being denied. Buys told the media that the Movement was offering a “Plan B” for Afrikaners. South Africa’s “original plan” of a constitutional majority-ruled democracy as negotiated in the early 1990s, he explained, had deteriorated into a regime focused solely on the interests of blacks. Helpmekaar would see the Movement “do the things the government is not doing for Afrikaners” (Netwerk24, October 4, 2015). “The plan’s power lies in … us taking responsibility to create a future in South Africa”, Buys told Summit-goers. “We have long noticed that we cannot rely on the state to create a future for us” (Solidariteit/Solidarity, 6, 2015).
The Solidarity Movement was originally founded in 1902 as the whites-only Mineworkers’ Union (MWU). For most of the twentieth century, it represented semi-skilled Afrikaans-speaking miners. Like their American counterparts, these blue-collar workers were deeply invested in white supremacist rule (Davies 1979; O’Meara 1983; Katzenelson 2005; Roediger 2007; Isenberg 2016), and depended on racist labour legislation to shield them from undercutting by cheaper black labour. Mining constituencies were instrumental in electing the National Party (NP) to power in 1948 (Visser 2008), and the apartheid regime rewarded white workers’ political loyalty with expanded social welfare and race-based job reservation. But from the 1970s, stalling economic growth and growing black resistance forced the NP to reform its race-based labour dispensation. This shattered its alliance with white workers, and the MWU aligned with right-wing organizations. Expanding its membership beyond the mining industry to resist reforms from a broader power base, it grew from 18,000 members in 1980 to 44,000 by 1992. But the 1994 inauguration of a black majority government proved the futility of right-wing resistance, and the union, like the white population more broadly, was forced to come to terms with the “new” South Africa (Visser 2008; Van Zyl-Hermann 2014a).

In 1997, Flip Buys was appointed general secretary of the MWU, and initiated a process of restructuring and modernizing the union. Its membership expanded nationally across industries, evolving from blue-collar towards more highly trained workers. By its centenary, when the MWU relaunched as Solidarity, it represented 120,000 predominantly, though no longer exclusively, white workers. In addition to its labour concerns, it repositioned as a civil society organization bargaining for the rights of minorities and Afrikaans-speaking whites in particular. It subsequently launched a welfare organization, civil rights organization, internet-based media house, think-tank, financial services provider and various other organizations which by 2015 together comprised the Solidarity Movement. It increasingly commanded a significant public presence as a prominent Afrikaner organization challenging government policies – from affirmative action to symbolic politics surrounding language and heritage. Throughout, the Movement sought to present itself as a key extra-parliamentary counterweight to the ruling ANC (Visser 2008; Van Zyl-Hermann 2014a, 2014b). By 2015, the Movement boasted an official membership of 320,000 (Solidariteit/Solidarity, 6, 2015) and was one of South Africa’s wealthiest NGOs (News24, July 26, 2016). Moreover, it claimed that, if one included the households of official members, it represented one million Afrikaners – a powerful claim off a population of 2.7 million.5

Reinventing the past, representing “the people”

The Movement advanced a historical narrative which eulogized the century-old organization, imbuing its past, present and future with a sense of
coherence and purpose tied closely to the fortunes of the “Afrikaner people”. By 2011, when I conducted fieldwork at its headquarters, this narrative was ubiquitous throughout the Movement. It was communicated to members and employees by way of in-house magazines, newsletters, electronic communications and in meetings, and also transmitted to the broader public through promotional material, press statements and the Movement’s websites and publications.

An introductory video on the Movement’s website drew explicit parallels between the organization’s past and present while downplaying its working-class roots. It placed the 1902 establishment of Solidarity in the aftermath of the “Anglo-Boer War”, a time of hardship for the “young volk” as they lost the political independence of their Boer republics and, with it, their freedom. This forced thousands of Afrikaners off the countryside to eke out a living on the minefields. Focusing on political events and the ethnic identity of its members, the video explained that it was under these “challenging circumstances” that the MWU was founded to “protect the rights” of this community. From sepia-coloured stills representing these early years, the video then switched to lively images of the Movement’s contemporary leaders and rallies. “A century later”, a male voice-over boomed, “we are Solidarity, the oldest civil rights organization in South Africa, still marching forward to defend and promote its members’ interests”. Images depicting South Africa’s political transition and the new millennium signalled a modern, rapidly changing world. Again, the emphasis fell on the political consequences of this “new reality”: “our people experience extreme pressure, unlawful affirmative action, and policies which eschew human rights”, a female voice narrated as headlines announcing soaring crime levels, corruption and failing service delivery moved across the screen. In the face of this latest struggle, Solidarity continued to work to secure a “safe, free, and prosperous” future for “our people”.

The Movement’s efforts to present itself as Afrikaners’ voice were also evident in communications directed at its membership, where this narrative was offered in more detail. In a claim rivalling black South Africans’ battle for freedom and rights, Solidarity magazine portrayed the early twentieth century as amounting to Afrikaners’ own struggle history. Throughout this struggle, the MWU was said to have consistently supported its members, who were represented as marginalized and socially disadvantaged. The Movement claimed, for instance, to have been closely involved in “community-based” efforts to uplift the impoverished Afrikaners during the 1930s and 1940s. Independently from the state, it helped Afrikaners pull themselves up by their bootstraps (Solidariteit/Solidarity, 2, 2012; 6, 2009; 2, 2014). The Movement was therefore presented as distinguished by a history of resisting injustice and defending the vulnerable. This resonated with its representation of Afrikaners’ and whites’ position in contemporary South Africa, and the role
it claimed in this context. Indeed, statements legitimizing the Movement’s claims to minority leadership abounded during the MWU’s 110th anniversary in 2012. In a revealing present tense statement, CEO Flip Buys declared that the “union’s historical fate runs hand in hand with that of white South Africans” (Solidariteit/Solidarity, 3, 2012).

This discursive strategy remoulded the past to obscure racial privilege and white supremacy. This was made clear during Solidariteitkunde, a seminar introducing newly appointed staff members to the Movement. When I attended the seminar in September 2011, it was presented by Movement Deputy CEO Dirk Hermann to the latest cohort of all-white, Afrikaans-speaking employees. From political defeat and economic destitution at the beginning of the century, Hermann narrated the triumphant “self-help” rise of the volk. The MWU was described as “a golden thread [running] through this early development of the Afrikaner” and it was “thanks to the [votes of] mining districts, where the MWU played a central role”, that the NP came to power in 1948. This, by implication, saw the rights and freedom Afrikaners had lost at the beginning of the century restored. Indeed, in the Movement’s discursive framing, the period of Afrikaner rule functioned implicitly as a romanticized golden era. No mention was made of the policies which the MWU voted into power, or the majority at whose expense they came.

Yet, continuing its selective representation of the past, the Movement was careful to distance itself from apartheid. Thus Hermann claimed that, after 1948, the MWU “were on and off with the National Party, often there was great tension … [but] we were always successful in maintaining our independence”. During interviews, both Hermann and Buys maintained this historical misrepresentation, presenting the Movement as having a history of political opposition, independence from the state, and being critical of the government of the day.

This selective representation of the past – obscuring the long history of white supremacy and foregrounding, instead, Afrikaners’ victimhood and resilience – also found expression in the Movement’s products. In 2011, its publishing house released Hermann’s book Basta! Ons voetspore is in Afrika (“Enough! Our footprints are in Africa”). A family history written as a letter to Hermann’s daughters, the book chronicles the stories of individuals in the family tree who conveniently passed by the landmarks of Afrikaner nationalist history – settlement from Europe, the great trek, the wars of independence – and formed part of the volk which “stood up” in the mid-twentieth century. Basta! portrayed Afrikaners’ success – an unexplored notion which implicitly referred to their political and economic power from 1948 – in terms of “inner strength – not affirmative action” and “the discipline of extreme spruceness and hard work […] rather than the external system of apartheid” (Hermann 2011, 51, 76). Addressing his daughters, Hermann (2011, 8–9) explicitly sought to decriminalize the Afrikaner past:
I want to free you from the myth that, because of privilege and exploitation, we carry 350 years’ worth of guilt. I want to free you from the tyranny of the majority-led representation of the past. Daddy is writing this letter because you are my children of Africa; you are free Afrikaners. Live this freedom.

Hermann’s narrative made a powerful claim to Afrikaner universality, his personal history representing the destiny of the volk, much as the Solidariteit-kunde narrative portrayed the MWU/Solidarity as a “golden thread” running through Afrikaner – or white – history. Hermann cast himself as the liberator-redeemer of his daughters’ history, mirroring the historical narrative’s representation of the Movement as Afrikaners’ saviour organization.

Populist identifications of “the people” are never completely new, but emerge through the redefinition of existing “traces of a certain content shaped by language and history” (Panizza 2005, 9). Apartheid-era Afrikaner nationalist discourses centred on a “narrative of national suffering and redemptive resistance to oppression” (Dubow 2014, 18). The Movement remade this historical narrative – so familiar to its audience (Thompson 1985; Van Rooyen 1994) – to centre on the Movement itself, legitimizing it as the defender and voice of “the people”. It asserted a nationalist framing of Afrikaners as a culturally distinctive volk with a common history, adding a common post-apartheid experience of victimhood and marginalization. Scholars of post-apartheid Afrikaner identity and whiteness have noted the fragmented expression of such sentiments in the cultural and private sphere. The Movement drew these together, giving them coherence and focus, and constructing a clear “internal frontier” (Laclau 2005, 74) vis-à-vis the majority “other”.

The ethnic nationalist register of this populist framing was flexible enough to also speak in broader racial terms. In contrast to prevailing South African narratives celebrating the end of apartheid, the Movement represented democratization in distinctly negative terms – a “total change in the political order” which rendered “our people” an “increasingly alienated” “minority in a majority setting”. Hermann illustrated this with an anecdote:

A lamb and two wolves were walking down the road. Soon it was lunchtime and all three grew hungry. So they decided to vote about what to have for lunch, democracy is the right thing, after all. And so the two wolves voted to eat the lamb – and they did.

“That’s the problem with a normal democracy”, Hermann concluded drily, “that’s why we need extra protection”. This cynical portrayal served to claim special privileges and protection for Afrikaners, or whites, by representing them as victimized on account of their racial identity. Buys, too, represented government policy and legislation as leaving whites “excluded”, “feeling vulnerable” and “targeted” (Solidariteit/Solidarity, 4, 2007). In this hostile political environment, the Movement claimed the task of ensuring they were not – as the parable suggested – devoured by the majority.
Recasting race, undermining black majority rule

The historical narrative was reinforced by powerful ideological distinctions which constructed a polarized opposition between the Movement, Afrikaners and whites, and their “constitutive enemies” (Panizza 2005, 17), the ruling ANC elite and the African majority. During Solidariteitkunde, in its magazine and on its website, the Movement identified itself as rooted in the Christian tradition of trade unionism, alongside Belgian, German and Dutch trade unions. This was juxtaposed with “the other main tradition of trade unionism” of socialism, which drew on Marxist convictions, and characterized the predominantly black unions organized in the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), an alliance partner of the ANC.

This effortlessly established racialized us-and-them divisions. To the Movement’s white audience, these designations resonated with apartheid-era notions of the threats of African nationalism and of Communism (Giliomee 2011; Dubow 2014), while also positioning the Movement as part of a global white Western community. Indeed, “Christian” readily slipped from a trade union label to a cultural, racial or even moral marker. When I asked Buys whether South Africans outside the Afrikaner community joined, he affirmed that the Movement also had white English-speaking members. Afrikaans and English-speaking whites were “Westerners” sharing an “intellectual … Christian heritage”, he explained. Hence, English-speakers felt “much more at home” with the Movement than in the Africanized new South Africa. This suspension of the Movement’s ethnic nationalist identifications to appeal to other whites reflects Laclau’s (2005) observations on the imprecision of populist discourse, intent on encompassing a heterogenous social reality in its construction of a simple insider/outsider dichotomy. These racial distinctions were further given a moral undertone which demonized the black majority. Buys continued to recast race as culture when in an interview he questioned whether Zuma, with his traditionalist “value system” – was able to run South Africa’s “modern, sophisticated market economy”. This “clash of values”, Buys argued, made “the people” distrust the ANC government.

The interactive setting of Solidariteitkunde demonstrated how this discursive strategy drew on existing prejudices to produce its racialized and moralized framing. During the seminar, Hermann identified equality as the “core value” of socialist trade unionism. Thus, he explained, socialist unions stick closely to ruling parties, so centralized power might realize the socialist goal of redistributing wealth. “But you have to line your own pockets first!” one participant interjected jokingly, eliciting chuckles from those present. This remark, and the reaction it evoked, demonstrated the instinctive intelligibility of the us-and-them divisions – so much so that participants were ready to add their own embellishments. Hermann readily capitalized on the remark: “Yes, look, that’s unfortunately the dishonesty of that tradition, it is absolutely
prone to corruption.” These discursive strategies saw vertical and horizontal polarization collapsed so that the self-serving elite seemed to simply reflect general attributes of the majority “other” it represented.

Christian and socialist unions were further differentiated in terms of their relationship to the state. “The problem [with the socialist tradition],” Hermann continued, “is of course that it makes you dependent … because the state will provide”. He pointed to South Africa’s system of social welfare grants as evidence of ANC socialism. This dependence resulted in a rejection of personal responsibility and “a strong culture of blame, that is, it’s someone else’s fault – the government, apartheid, colonialism, everyone, because it is not your responsibility”. To this ostensible socialist dependence on an interventionist state, Hermann contrasted Solidarity’s self-help approach and Christian trade unionism’s “core value” of “calling”: “[this means] you are responsible for living out that calling. You can’t say it is the responsibility of the central power, because remember … then you become dependent on it”. This represented a resourceful reinvention of what was once a central concept in Christian Nationalism, the Afrikaner “civil religion” for most of the twentieth century. With its roots in nineteenth century republicanist understandings of Boer pioneers’ covenant with their Christian God, “calling” had been a central mobilizing concept in the Afrikaner nationalist movement of the 1930s and 1940s (Moodie 1975) – the very years the Movement eulogized as seeing Afrikaners’ spontaneous “standing up”. Calling did similar mobilizing work in the hands of those who saw themselves as the contemporary leaders of the volk: this “strong ideology of self-reliance”, Hermann explained, “means we have to put institutions in place to accomplish things, not the state”.

These ideological, racial and moral divisions were, finally, presented as natural. One incident was often recounted as evidence of the difference between socialist and Christian trade unions. In 2005, the Stilfontein goldmine outside Klerksdorp was liquidated following earthquake damage, leaving 6,500 workers unemployed. In addition to retraining and alternative employment, the Solidarity trade union also provided foodstuffs to its struggling members. Then members of the COSATU-affiliated National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) occupied Solidarity’s food distribution point. In response, Buys contacted then NUM general secretary Gwede Mantashe, suggesting the unions work together to raise emergency relief financing.

And what did Gwede tell Flip? […] Gwede said, “The government will take care of it, Flip, it’s not our responsibility, government will do it.” Government did not take care of it, so what happened? We [Solidarity] went – because we are Christian, so we definitely won’t say “you’re black and you’re from NUM so you’re not getting any food”. […] The logical thing is for us to offer help – you don’t think twice about it, you know, it is in you!
In one swift move, individual self-reliance and community self-help was naturalized as an inherent attribute. Buys extended this beyond Christian trade unionism to a broader white community. In a strong moral condemnation of the black trade union, he told me how even conservative white farmers contributed food to the Stilfontein workers, while the NUM “did nothing”. “I can’t imagine how these [NUM] guys sleep at night”, continued Buys, exasperated. On another occasion, he similarly asserted that Solidarity members – or Afrikaners, or whites; he used these labels interchangeably – possessed an inherent *selfdoenkultuur* (literally “self-doing-culture”), which meant that they naturally responded proactively to challenges: “[T]hat’s the difference between us and COSATU, NUM. If there’s a crisis, their people don’t have a *selfdoenkultuur*, they are socialists who wait for the state”, Buys stated categorically. “I don’t like it, but I can’t change it, it’s in them, I have the impression they’re programmed like that.”

The Movement’s us-and-them polarization represented a truly innovative discursive strategy: Although the Movement’s historical narrative obscured its working-class past, it utilized its trade union roots to claim an apparently objective basis for its divisive identity politics. Its critical portrayal of socialist unionism invoked race-based cultural and biological differences which fed off existing understandings prevalent among its target audience. The resulting moral hierarchy in which “the [white] people” emerged as superior and virtuous vis-à-vis the black majority served to undermine the integrity of majority rule and subvert moral obligation to the state in favour of racial and ethnic solidarities. In this way, authority was transposed to the Movement as saviour organization, making it a contender for political power and legitimacy, albeit outside formal party politics.

This naturalization saw the Movement’s historical narrative and racial polarization merge in a powerful mobilizing framework. Hermann told Solidariteit-kunde participants:

> You’ll start to see now that the ideas we are talking about here are very familiar in the Afrikaner’s DNA. If you look back through our history, you’ll recognize *exactly* the same DNA that was used to stand up after the war. It’s exactly the DNA which was employed to stand up out of the 1930s. Those ideas – simple ideas – of calling, work, responsibility. These were powerful things that were used to let Afrikaners stand up out of difficult circumstances. […] The fact that Solidarity is part of the Christian tradition of trade unionism is a powerful instrument for Afrikaners to also stand up after 1994, it is a powerful political answer to say that we will take responsibility, we want to be self-reliant, we won’t be dependent on the government.

The Solidariteit-kunde participants, like the readers of *Solidarity* magazine or those perusing the Movement’s website, were encouraged to see their own lives reflected in those of their early twentieth century: their “Afrikaner DNA” fundamentally predisposed them to desire independence, to take
responsibility and act proactively in the interests of “their people”. Just as their ancestors had yearned for their sovereignty to be restored after the loss of the Boer republics, this narrative held, so contemporary Afrikaners desired independence from the post-apartheid state.

**Fusing nationalism and neoliberal logic, advancing white autonomy**

This discourse of freedom from state control and of individual and community responsibilization saw neoliberal rationalities characterizing the late capitalist present incorporated into the Movement’s national populist rhetoric. As a theory of political economic practices, neoliberalism champions competition and liberty of individual choice as the best guarantors of human well-being. As a political and economic project, consequently, it presses for the roll-back of state intervention and the extension of commercial transactions in its place. This emphasis on choice and competition is accompanied by an insistence on individual responsibility and merit (Jessop 2002; Harvey 2009). Since the 1970s, the global shift towards neoliberalism has seen it become hegemonic to the extent that Harvey (2009, 3) deems it “the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world”. It has led to the withdrawal of state provision and the encroachment of the market into areas like health care, education, security and social welfare, and an accompanying devolution of responsibility to local-level government, civil society and individual citizens amid the retreat of the state (Marais 2011). The idealization of self-help and responsibilization typically plays a central role in these arrangements, often offsetting gaps created by “freedom” from state intervention (Jessop 2002).\(^\text{11}\)

While neoliberal policies and practices vary according to the specificities of local contexts, they remain characterized by these general features (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010; Marais 2011).

The Movement’s discursive strategies bore the imprint of such neoliberal “common sense” fused with nationalist populist political logic. Its cynical representation of state-centred redistribution, the Stilfontein story, and its criticism of the abuses of ANC-rule were as much critiques of state intervention and failure as they were discursive constructions of African elites and the black majority as the threatening “other”. Concomitantly, Afrikaners and whites more generally were constituted as predisposed towards independence and self-reliance. Such constructions served to legitimize the Movement’s campaign – as outlined in the Helpmekaar plan – for achieving white autonomy in majority-ruled South Africa through its constituent organizations. For instance, the Movement had already set up Afrikaans-medium educational infrastructure in the form of its distance learning institution, Akademia, and its technical training institute, SolTech. Both offered
subsidized training to Movement members and their children. Helpmekaar earmarked R1 billion for expanding this infrastructure, including developing Akademia into a comprehensive private university. Study loans and bursaries already offered by the welfare organization Helping Hand would be expanded. Beyond education, the Solidarity trade union was set to broaden existing benefits and services offered to its members. In addition to collective representation and workplace support, the union took a cradle-to-grave approach, providing members with medical, training, legal, financial and leisure benefits and services. By also accepting individual members, the union catered beyond traditional unionized sectors and appealed to professional classes. Furthermore, Helpmekaar would see the Movement’s civil rights organization AfriForum invest R735 million in community-based security structures, public infrastructure and service delivery where local authorities were failing. Helpmekaar would also support the Movement’s cultural partners such as the Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Organizations and Kraal Publishers to promote Afrikaans, establish a virtual Afrikaner museum, and develop lecture plans for Afrikaner history to supplement school curricula (“Helpmekaarplan” 2015; Solidariteit/Solidarity, 6, 2015; Maroela Media, October 10, 2015).

The Movement did not, therefore, aspire to formal political or territorial autonomy. Rather, it envisaged institutional, community and even virtual spaces in which Afrikaners and whites could organize their own affairs, self-sufficient and free from black, majority intervention. Several initiatives evoked welfare state resonances as the Movement sought to advance the well-being of its members and broader target constituency in a privatized capacity, itself performing state-like functions it accused the majority-run state of neglecting. These efforts ran together with market-based forms of commercial service provision targeting a particular ethnic and racial constituency. Neoliberal logics of responsibilization and freedom therefore facilitated a populist community-focused response to protect white interests and privilege. Despite not involving formal self-determination, however, these strategies were clearly understood as political interventions. Indeed, the Movement sought to form “a power bloc with the will and ability to make and execute decisions in the [white, Afrikaner] community’s interests, and where necessary engage constructively with the authorities on matters of interest” (“Krisisberaad” 2015). During Solidariteitkunde, Hermann explained how without a parliamentary majority, whites had little formal political power to shape politics and legislation. But by founding its “own institutions” through private initiatives in the civil society arena, Hermann explained, “[we] take up the same authority as a majority party in Parliament. These initiatives make us stronger than the ANC”.

Conclusion

In the white majority contexts of the United States and Europe, national populism in its current incarnations seeks to capture formal political power, from whence it claims it will return sovereignty to “the people” and cast out the forces which threaten them (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008). In South Africa, the white minority’s lack of political leverage and territorial dispersion is seeing an assertive new national populist challenge for white autonomy mounted in the civil society arena rather than the formal party political sphere.

Anti-establishment sentiments in the global North – whether directed at the European Union’s alienating supranationalism or a class of elite politicians – have been a driving force of the rise of national populism. In South Africa, too, the crisis of the state under Zuma, and popular outrage about it, is not in doubt. To this, the new white minority politics of the Solidarity Movement offers a racialized response, built on its whitewashed portrayal of the past and subversion of black majority rule. Indeed, collapsing vertical and horizontal dimensions of polarization, the Movement extends the corruption and state failure associated with ANC elites to a general callousness among all black South Africans. In contrast, Afrikaners – and whites generally – emerge as moral, biological, indeed racial superiors on account of their “self-doing-culture.” This serves to cast aspersions on black majority rule. In typical national populist fashion, the Movement claims to be the authentic representative of this homogenous and virtuous “people” and promises to put their interests first. Downplaying class and maintaining an ambiguous rhetoric appealing to exclusive ethnic identity and broader racial interests figure centrally in this strategy. Thus, despite its humble working-class roots and right-wing marginality in the late apartheid period, the Movement attracts broad-based support and increasingly claims to represent the central ground.

These findings bring a view from the South to studies of national populism and its consequences for democracy. The Solidarity Movement’s discourses and campaigns demonstrate how, in a multicultural context, national populist political logics need not operate in the formal political sphere to gain support and momentum for alternative forms of autonomy from the state. When emanating from a powerful minority, the antagonism towards the ostensibly hostile (ruling) majority which this involves may undermine democratic consolidation and social cohesion. These are important insights for countries of the global North steadily moving towards greater racial and cultural heterogeneity.

Notes

1. Populism in Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey, India and Japan has also received attention, albeit to a much lesser degree (Brubaker 2017; Pandowski 2010; Mudde 2007; Panitch and Albo 2015).

3. On whiteness as victimhood in Southern Africa more broadly, see Van Zyl-Hermann and Boersema (2017).

4. This is not to discount the ANC’s achievements since 1994. For both sides of the coin, see Meyiwa et al. (2014).

5. The intersection of race (“white”) and mother language (“Afrikaans”) sees 2.7 million South Africans classified as Afrikaners in 2011 (Statistics South Africa 2012).

6. Scholars now refer to the 1899–1902 conflict as the South African War, thereby acknowledging the participation of black South Africans. The Solidarity Movement eschews this inclusive term.

7. I was told that “Solidariteitkunde” (literally “the study of Solidarity”) was also presented to union members in the workplace.

8. No relation to the author.


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